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Abstract. Inspired by the root cause analysis techniques that in the
field of safety research and practice help investigators understand the
reasons of an incident, this paper investigates the use of root cause anal-
ysis in security. We aim at providing a systematic method for the security
analyst to identify the socio-technical attack modes that can potentially
endanger a system’s security.
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1 Introduction
Accounting for the impact of a user in a system’s security incident is a complex
matter. In safety, this impact is usually studied by applying Human Reliability
Analysis to predict how reliable a system is or Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
to understand the reasons of an incident where humans are involved. These
techniques are not practised in security, but we argue that they should. They
would help understanding why security fails in the presence of humans. However,
applying RCA in security is not straightforward, it needs some adjustments.
The primary cause of any security incident is unsurprisingly the attacker.
But the success of an attacker’s Socio-Technical Attacks —attacks that rely at
least partially on the presence of human users— also depends on the system,
the user, and the context: users can err and create security failures by execut-
ing security critical actions (e.g., clicking on an infected attachment), whereas
human factors (e.g., carelessness), usability problems, and disturbances in the
human environment (e.g., noise, psychological pressure) catalyse such situations.
These untangled factors are pre-conditions for the attacker’s ability to trigger
what is often dismissed as “human errors”. But if this is the conclusion of a secu-
rity analysis, no one would know how to secure the system except by extruding
completely the user. This drastic solution is obviously severely limited. In the
field of safety-critical systems instead, a “human error” is not a conclusion but
a start, a symptom of further underlying causes that calls for investigating its
“root causes”. This is what an insightful security analysis should also do. To
this concern we hypothesize that cascades of events that lead to the success of
user-mediated attacks are comparable to the ones studied in safety and that it
is possible, in a socio-technical analysis of security, to retrieve a root cause more
informative than the mere “human error”.
Contribution. Inspired by the RCA techniques that are used in the field of safety
research and practice, we devise a method to compile a catalog of Socio-Technical
Attack Modes (AMs).3 These are events injected by the attacker that may drive
the user to err (e.g., trusting a malicious link) while executing a critical action
(e.g., clicking on a link) and initiating a cascade of steps eventually ending with
the attacker harming a system’s security. AMs actually exploit Error Modes (i.e.,
ways to err) and reveal the complex interplay among the user, the system, and
the context.
The catalog we present could serve (a) to analyze the user-system interactions
in search for patterns that are known to trigger Error Modes and eventually harm
the system’s security, and (b) to identify realistic vulnerabilities of socio-technical
nature in those interactions under an extended threat model that accounts for
the effect of the intruder’s action on the user. From the attacker’s capabilities
one can determine what effect s/he has on the system and consequently what
controls can be applied in defence.
Overall, this paper answers two research questions. Does applying RCA give
original insights into the cause of success of existing attacks? Can we find new
attacks thanks to RCA techniques? Given the space constraints of this short
paper, we can only sum up how we customized a RCA technique to build a
small catalog of Attack Modes. A description of the whole methodology and
the compilation of a comprehensive catalog of attacks will be developed in an
extended version of this paper.
Related Works. The most relevant works related to this paper’s objectives are:
Cranor et al. work on security-related communications [1], Curzon et al.’s Cog-
nitive Framework [2], and Carlos et al. [3] proposal of a taxonomy of human-
protocol weaknesses. They all discuss the role of users in security and, from dif-
ferent perspectives, explain how human features may affect security. Our work
can be seen as a re-elaboration of those discussions, extended and integrated in
our methodology of analysis for the search of root cause analysis in security.
2 Methods
Our methodology combines socio-technical security analysis with Root Cause
Analysis (RCA) as inspired from the safety field. First we select and adapt a
RCA technique for security; then we use this technique to build a catalog of
generic (socio-technical) Attack Modes (AMs) observed in actual attacks. We
draw our sample of actual attacks from the CAPEC [4] attack library. We use
the adapted RCA to explain the success of known attacks and to check if it
covers explanations from the literature. We also augment our explanation with
the causes brought up by the analysis of root causes.
3 For improved readability, we do not spell out ‘socio-technical’ in the following while
it has to be systematically assumed
Selecting an RCA technique and adapting it for security. We selected
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) [5] as our preferred
RCA. CREAM is a 2nd generation Human Reliability Analysis; it focuses on
errors whereas more recent techniques consider human performance as a contin-
uum [6]. By considering cognitive causes of errors, CREAM brings a great deal
of details in the analysis of an accident and because of such richness in details it
has been criticized in Human Reliability Analysis [7]. However, such richness is
what makes CREAM a great candidate for computer security: a security analy-
sis should identify all factors that an attacker can use to push a human to err.
Among other criteria, the most important aspect of CREAM is that it offers
retrospective and prospective analysis. Thus, it provides us with bi-directional
links between causes and effects. This allows us to build a catalog of AMs that
can be used in both ways: in detecting attacks (starting from observed effects)
and in predicting attacks (starting from a threat model).
CREAM relies on two pillars: (1) a classification of erroneous actions (this is
represented in tables linked together by causal relationships), and (2) a method
that describes how to follow those links back to the human, the contextual
and the technological factors at the origin of an “event”. An event is caused
by the manifestation of an “erroneous action”, and is called the phenotype [5].
The confluence of underlying factors that made the erroneous action arise is
called its genotype. CREAM’s tables of causal relationships between antecedent
(cause of errors) and consequent (effect of errors) link a phenotype with its
genotype [5]. Following these causal relationships, it is possible to find what
caused an erroneous action and the root cause(s) of an event.
CREAM is a building block of our method, but it needs to be customized for
security. We call the result S·CREAM, which stands for “Security CREAM”.
Applying the RCA and building a catalog of AMs. We apply our RCA
to build a catalog of AMs. We take as input a library of known attack patterns
which we got from Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) [4]. This library contains attacks “generated from in-depth analysis of
specific real-world exploit examples”.4 It is maintained by MITRE Coorporation,
and it is the only detailed classification scheme where attacks centered on the user
are compiled and documented. We use CAPEC’s repository to extract and select
those Attack Patterns whose success relies on a critical action of the user. The
CAPEC taxonomy contains descriptions of social-engineering Attack Patterns,
together with their pre-requisites, mechanisms and possible mitigations.
3 S·CREAM: An RCA for computer security
We describe S·CREAM, the technique we devise by customizing CREAM and
that we propose as the way to identify root causes of socio-technical attacks.
4 See https://capec.mitre.org/
3.1 Adapting CREAM as an RCA technique for security
S·CREAM’s retrospective analysis draws on CREAM, but it needed adaptations
because of our computer security focus.
In CREAM’s retrospective analysis, one first defines common performance
conditions to describe the analyzed event, then the Error Modes to investigate.
This investigation is a process where the analyst searches for the antecedents of
each Error Mode. This process is recursive: each antecedent an analyst finds can
be investigated in turn. Antecedents justified by other antecedents are called
“generic”; those which are “sufficient in themselves” are called “specific”. To
avoid following “generic antecedents” endlessly, one must stop the investigation
on the current branch when a “specific antecedent” is found to be the most likely
cause of the event.
The computer security context in which we intend to use CREAM’s retro-
spective analysis calls for a different procedure because of three main singularities
that make it peculiar: (a) we already know that an attacker is the initiator of the
cascade of events and what message s/he has sent the user, (b) erroneous actions
are already defined, and (c) we lack contextual information as we operate from
a generic description of Attack Patterns. Two adaptations to CREAM’s retro-
spective analysis methods are therefore needed. First, we customize the phase
preceding the investigation: instead of formalizing the context in common per-
formance conditions, S·CREAM uses its own description of the event focusing
on the information flowing between the attacker and the user; we describe this
part in the next section. Second, S·CREAM uses a less restrictive stop rule.
Doing so we avoid pointing invariably to the attacker’s action, and we investi-
gate additional contributing antecedents. So, where CREAM stops as soon as
a specific antecedent is found being a likely cause of the event, S·CREAM lists
all likely specific antecedents for the event plus the specific antecedents that are
contained into sibling generic antecedents, it then stops the investigation of the
current branch.
To choose between the different possible antecedents that CREAM’s tables
propose, we look at the Attack Pattern’s description that we built before the
analysis and we stick to the attacker’s actions we described.
3.2 Using S·CREAM
As stated previously, S·CREAM needs a description of the Attack Patterns under
scrutiny. The most important aspect is that this description should enable us to
choose objectively among the different paths possible through the antecedent-
consequent links. To describe each Attack Pattern before the analysis, we follow
what has been proposed in [8]: describing Attack Patterns as a set of messages
flowing between the attacker and the victim prior to the manifestation of the
critical action. Thus, this first event that initiates the attack is described through
common properties shared by the messages sent from the attacker to the user.
In synthesis: (1) a source, that is the principal that the user believes to be
interacting with, (2) an identity split into a declared identity (i.e., who the
attacker says he is, like the from field of an email) and imitated identity (i.e.,
who the attacker imitates by stealing a logo for instance), (3) a command for the
user to execute, (4) an action description, to state for instance if the action is
booby-trapped or spoofed, (5) a sequence that describes the temporal situation
of the message, and (6) a medium (web, phone, paper).
Running S·CREAM on identified Attack Patterns. Once an Attack Pat-
tern is described, we perform the S·CREAM analyses on the critical actions
carried out by the victim (those with an effect on the system’s security). We
have at least one Error Mode for each Attack Pattern. Additional Error Modes
may have to be analysed in the course of events that lead to the critical ac-
tion, for instance when the victim first encounters the attacker and misidentifies
him/her as being trustworthy.
From Error Modes to AMs. Attack Modes are ways to exploit Error Modes
that stem from the interaction between the user, the system and the surrounding
context. For instance, an AM can state that an attacker, who can send messages
to the user of a system that displays ambiguous symbols may be able to usurp
somebody else’s identity (this is the effect on the system’s security). AMs are
readily usable links between Threat Models and possible security-harming effects
enabled by particular user-system interactions.
4 Building the catalog of Attack Modes
To start we need to have a database of known existing Attack Patterns, and we
chose to look for them in CAPEC. Applying S·CREAM is about reconstructing
the chain of events that lead to harming a system’s security. The results of
the S·CREAM analyses unveil contributing factors to those events that, thanks
to the bi-directional nature of CREAM’s causation links, we could turn into
a catalog of AMs. We identified 16 Attack Patterns out of CAPEC where the
user is at the source of the success of the attack. For the sake of space, we
only report on one Attack Pattern, the CAPEC-195 “Principal Spoofing”. This
Attack Pattern is not considered an issue from a sole technical point of view: its
root cause mostly depends on the user’s weaknesses and technical factors only
increase its likelihood. We first detail how we translate this Attack Pattern into
our framework, then we perform a S·CREAM analysis of its causes of success.
Translation of CAPEC-195 “Principal Spoofing” into S·CREAM. In
the CAPEC-195 “Principal Spoofing” Attack Pattern, the attacker pretends to
be one more actor in the interaction. This attack relies on the content of the
message to appear that it reflects an honest identity. Its translation into our
framework can be summed up by the following: (1) the source is another principal
that the target knows, (2) the imitated identity is used because the appearance
of the message is crafted to reflect the source’s identity, (3) the command is
not specified, (4) the attacker is the initiator of the non-spoofed action “disclose
information” or “perform action on behalf of the attacker”, (5) the message is
a continuation of a previous interaction as the target must know the principal,
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Fig. 1. Part of S·CREAM’s investigation of the “Wrong Object” Error Mode (EM)
observed in CAPEC-195. A green traffic light means that we consider the specific
antecedent as being a contributor or that we expand the generic antecedent. A red
traffic light means that we do not consider that the antecedent contributes to the
EM. An additional stop sign means that we encountered a specific antecedent that
is a probable cause in the current branch and that the stop rule is now engaged.
Additional sibling generic antecedents of “Wrong identification” are not displayed and
specific antecedents and generic antecedents are abbreviated as SA and GA.
Table 1. Justifications of the selections of contributors for the “Wrong identification”
generic antecedent. Specific antecedents inside generic antecedents are not named and
specific antecedents and generic antecedents are abbreviated as SA and GA.
Antecedent Justification
SA “Ambiguous Signals and
Symbols”
The usability of the interface can contribute to this Error Mode.
SA “Habit and Expectancies” As the message sent by the attacker is a continuation from a previous
interaction we can reasonably consider that this antecedent plays a
role in the target’s behavior.
GA “Distraction” We don’t have additional information regarding the SAs contained in
this GA in our description. But it is likely that the user was performing
a main task while assessing the identity of the attacker, so we consider
SA “Competing task” as an additional contributor.
GA “Missing Information” The attacker deliberately hides its real identity and the presentation
fails to clearly state the sender identity. So we consider the corre-
sponding SAs as contributors.
GA “Faulty Diagnosis” The user may have a wrong mental model about how to assess identity,
or misunderstood previous explanations.
and (6) the medium can be on screen or paper, in person or by phone (“either
written, verbal, or visual”).
Detailed Root Cause Analyses. In the following, the EM is analyzed us-
ing Serwy et al.’s [9] implementation of CREAM’s tables. The main EM of this
Attack Pattern is the misidentification of the attacker for another principal, we
identify it as being a “Wrong object:Similar Object” EM. Figure 1 shows among
the possible antecedents for this EM, which path we follow: as the declared iden-
tity is not used in this attack, the specific antecedents related to the labeling do
not contribute to the behavior. Therefore, we continue the analysis by looking
at the generic antecedents: following the generic antecedent “Wrong identifica-
tion:Incorrect identification”, the specific antecedent ’Erroneous information’ is
selected as contributor because the imitated identity is spoofed. This root cause
provided by S·CREAM is the same as the explanation provided by CAPEC: the
wrong information furnished by the attacker tricks the user. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, we follow our custom stop rule and consider the other specific antecedents
and sibling generic antecedents for this branch.
Following the analysis out of this branch, the next generic antecedent “Com-
munication failure” leads to the specific antecedent “inattention”. The last generic
antecedent is “Observation missed” where the specific antecedent “multiple sig-
nal” is likely if the attack is run on a computerized medium.
Results. The analyses we performed with S·CREAM on the set of 16 Attack
Patterns that we extracted from CAPEC yielded numerous antecedents; assum-
ing that CREAM’s bi-directional links of causation can be trusted, we consider
that these antecedents can be exploited by an attacker to facilitate the occur-
rence of critical actions. For the sake of space, we only report on the AMs whose
effect is to give the attacker the ability to usurp another actor’s identity. Most
of the following AMs were built by listing the specific antecedents resulting from
the S·CREAM analysis of CAPEC-195: “Principal Spoofing” and CAPEC-194
“Fake source of data”.
Table 2 compiles the AMs that an attacker with certain capabilities can use
against a system working under specific conditions. Because those AMs are built
from the data provided by CAPEC, there are no assumptions about the users.
5 Discussion
The example we develop in §4 shows that an RCA-based technique like S·CREAM
improves our understanding of known attacks without the need of looking each
time into the literature or performing user studies ourselves. We believe that
in this regard, S·CREAM is an effective tool for security practitioners who
want to investigate specific user-mediated attacks at a lesser cost. Furthermore,
S·CREAM identifies contributors to the success of an attack that are not con-
sidered in taxonomies such as CAPEC.
The contribution of S·CREAM to research is also substantial. E.g., it is well
known that the Wi-Fi selection process suffers from security issues bound to
Table 2. AMs an attacker can use to usurp an identity. AMs that only require the
attacker to be able to send a message are not shown for the sake of space, namely: Bad
mental Models, Mislearning, Inattention, and Multiple Signals.
Attack mode Prerequisites
System Attacker
Incorrect label Amendable messages Change sender’s field in a message
Erroneous Information Displayed information is
not verified
Can send a message with falsified information or
the visual identity of another actor
Ambiguous symbol Bad usability, symbols
are confusing
Can send a message that uses said symbols to
convey misleading signals
Habits and Expectancies Use is monotonous or
repetitive
Can send/replay/mimic a message. Knows about
previous user’s interactions.
Competing task Main task, or sub tasks Can send a message
Hidden information Provides amendable info Can alter the information provided in messages
Presentation failure Amendable interface Can send a message that abuses presentation
the misconceptions that people have about the meaning of the different symbols
used in the graphical user interface [10]. Where user-studies and surveys had
been performed to investigate this problem from scratch, preliminary answers
could have been readily obtained through an S·CREAM analysis to support
the design of those studies. S·CREAM proposes an additional input allowing
to triangulate findings and thus contributes to validating such findings. Such a
combination of methods and data sources is an invaluable asset contributing to
consolidating the relatively young field of socio-technical security research.
Even if the exploitation of psychological characteristics in socio-technical
attacks arises (e.g., tabnabbing attack [11]), these remain mainly focused on
the user’s observation mistakes. S·CREAM and our catalog of AMs can help
anticipating more advanced attacks because S·CREAM yields new means to trick
users to err while performing security-critical actions; and our catalog lists the
potential attacks that can be fomented. S·CREAM can help refining attacks, and
adding information about the user and the context of the attack can open new
doors. Of course, the sheer possibility of an AM in a system does not guarantee
that an attack will happen, but it constitutes an additional entry point to the
system’s attack surface.
We think S·CREAM can be further specialized for computer security to bring
more specific information about the threat model required for each AM. We
can, for instance, map the concertina model of an existing framework for a
socio-technical analysis (see [8]) into what CREAM categorizes as the “Man-
Technology-Organization” triad, systematically linking where the attacker can
strike in the concertina interaction layers.
6 Conclusion
We have illustrated how to adapt Root Cause Analysis (RCA), a technique used
in safety to investigate the cause of “human errors”, to security. The result-
ing technique, named S·CREAM, is a valuable tool to identify the factors that
contribute to damage a system’ security by inappropriate, security critical user
actions. We used S·CREAM to build an initial catalog of socio-technical Attack
Modes (AMs). This is only a first step: there is a need to apply S·CREAM on
more socio-technical attacks and attack patterns to improve the way it mod-
els them and the information it provides. We believe that the AMs catalog we
started building will lead to define a more realistic threat model, that is, one that
integrates user-mediated capabilities. Still, our catalog is preliminary. Expand-
ing its scope is future work: we intend to list additional AMs by using results
we could not report here. We also plan modifications to the S·CREAM method
to guarantee more objectivity in the analysis process, and in support to that,
the creation of a computer assisted tool to help the security analyst performing
his/her tasks.
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